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Abstract
This paper studies the pricing of delivery services and its impact on the market structure
in the-commerce sector. We focus on one of the ongoing trends, namely the develop-
ment of marketplaces. A retailer may not just sell its own products; but also provide
a marketplace for other sellers, o¤ering a variety of services including delivery. Mar-
ketplaces create a secondarymarket which undermines the delivery operators ability
to di¤erentiate prices. We study the subgame perfect equilibrium of a sequential game
with two operators where retailer 0 may potentially develop a marketplace. The deliv-
ery operator and retailer 0 bargain over the delivery rate. Then, retailer 0 chooses the
per-unit rate and the xed fee at which it is willing to sell its delivery service to the
other retailer. Finally, retailer 1 chooses its delivery option: either it directly patronizes
the independent delivery operator, or it uses the services o¤ered by the marketplace,
and the corresponding subgame is played. Analytical results are completed by numer-
ical simulations and lead to three main lessons. First the equilibrium nearly always
implies a discount to the leadingretailer, even when the prot maximizing operator
has all the bargaining power. Second, the delivery operator cannot avoid the emergence
of a marketplace even though this decreases its prots. Third, the market power of the
delivery operator cannot be assessed solely by considering its market share.
JEL classication: L1, L81, L5.
Keywords: E-commerce, parcel delivery, marketplace, pricing and market structure,
price discrimination
1 Introduction
As mail volumes continue to decline, parcel delivery becomes an increasingly important
market for postal operators. This market is expanding mainly because of the develop-
ment of e-commerce. European national postal operators handle some 4 billion parcels
every year. With a growth rate of 13.3% in 2015 (after a growth of 13.6% in 2014),
the online B2C (business to consumer) sales in Europe reached e455.3 billion in 2015.
Throughout Europe, 65% of internet users shop online (E-commerce Europe, 2016a). At
the same time the e-commerce sector is continuously evolving; right now it has certainly
not reached a steady state and it is hard to predict how this steady state will look like.
One of the ongoing trends is the development of marketplaces. Prominent exam-
ples include the American Amazon marketplace launched by Amazon.com in 2000, the
Chinese Alibaba established in 1999, the Japanese Rakuten founded in 1997 or eBay
founded in 1995. Founding a marketplace is a way for the original retailer to monetize
its original customer basis by displaying on its website the buying options provided by
other e-retailers in exchange of a fee. As intermediary platform the marketplace o¤ers a
showcase to sellers, and provides tools to the di¤erent parties (producers/retailers and
consumers/buyers) which simplify trading: online payment system, inventory manage-
ment, authenticated information about the seller and/or the buyer, various warranties
and more and more often integrated delivery services.1 As usual in two-sided markets,
the network externalities go in both directions. Consumers also benet from additional
buying options, both in terms of product variety and pricing, as the number of retailers
selling on the marketplace increases.
At a rst sight, this model appears to be a win-win agreement. However, as empha-
sized by Borsenberger (2015), it also has potential drawbacks. In particular, it could
end up making small e-retailers economically dependent from the marketplace and lead
to a larger degree of concentration in the e-commerce sector.
According to FEVAD (2016), in France, marketplaces are taking up a growing po-
sition in the e-commerce landscape: the volume of sales on marketplaces rose by 46%
1For instance through the Fulllment by Amazon program.
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between 2014 and 2015; 34% of French internet users have made purchases on market-
places during the last six months (between January and June 2016); 29% of e-retailers
use a marketplace to reach e-consumers. The total revenue of marketplaces is estimated
at almost e3 billion in 2015, which represents a 9% of online sales.2 Throughout the
world, a few leading marketplaces dominate the e-commerce market (E-commerce Eu-
rope, 2016b): Amazon is the leader in the US, in Canada, in the UK, in France, in
Germany and in Spain among others while Alibaba and JD.com dominate the Chinese
market with a market share of nearly 80%.
As previously said, a marketplace provides a variety of services, including shipping
and parcel delivery services. From a parcel delivery operators perspective marketplaces
create a secondary delivery market which undermines its ability to di¤erentiate prices
between its customers (the e-retailers) according to the volume and the characteristics of
the parcels they sent (size, weight, place where they enter into the postal process, degree
of upstream sorting, and so on). Marketplaces e¤ectively act as parcel aggregators,
consolidating the parcels sent by their a¢ liated sellers. By boosting the volume of
parcels provided to delivery operators by a single customer, the marketplace increases
its bargaining power. Consequently, it may be in a position to negotiate more attractive
commercial terms for the provision of delivery services than individual a¢ liated sellers.
Observe that parcel delivery is a market characterized by xed costs and returns to
scale which typically lead to volume-discount pricing schemes.
To sum up, the market structure in the e-commerce sector will a¤ect the pricing
strategy of the delivery operator.3 Interestingly, the e¤ect will also go in the opposite
direction: the pricing structure of parcel delivery will in part determine the development
of marketplaces.
Our paper deals with this interaction. We study the pricing of delivery services
and its impact on the market structure in the-commerce sector. Our study builds on
Borsenberger et al. (2016), which took a rst pass at this subject. In that paper we
consider a stylized e-commerce sector with a single parcel delivery operator and two
2 In 2012, these gures were respectively e1.3 billion and 6%.
3For a comprehensive study of e-commerce delivery price setting, see Copenhagen Economics(2016).
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di¤erentiated retailers, indexed 0 and 1. Retailer 0 is a bigretailer who also operates
a marketplace platform, which sells retail and delivery services to other rms. We
assume that all items are delivered by the parcel delivery operator. Retailer 1 can sell
independently or via the other retailers marketplace. When it sells independently it
uses the delivery services provided by the parcel delivery operator and pays the rate it
charges. In case of marketplace a¢ liation, it pays a fee to the other retailer who takes
care of parcels delivery. The current paper generalizes Borsenberger et al. (2016) in
three important directions. First, marketplaces use more sophisticated nonlinear pricing
policies when they sell their services to their a¢ liates. In particular, they can use two
part tari¤s charging a xed fee along with a per unit rate. This not only adds a realistic
feature to the analysis, but is shown to have a dramatic impact on the equilibrium
market structure.4 Second, we explicitly recognize the fact that marketplace may have
some monopsony power.5 More precisely, the delivery rates charged to the marketplace
are no longer set by the delivery operator as a take it or leave it o¤er. Instead, the
contractual arrangements between marketplace and delivery operator are the result of a
bargaining process. We consider a bargaining solution, in which the bargaining powers
of the parties are determined by their respective bargaining weights. Last but not least,
we have completely redesigned the numerical approach so that we can now derive a full
solution of a calibrated specication of our model. To our knowledge, no other paper
has studied the formation of marketplaces and even on the wider topic of competition
in parcel delivery the literature is sparse.6
The timing of the full gameconsisting of delivery and retail pricing is as follows.
In Stage 1 the postal operator sets the single piece rate. In Stage 2, the postal operator
and retailer 0 bargain over the delivery rate paid by the marketplace. In stage 3, retailer
0 chooses the per-unit rate and the xed fee at which it is willing to sell its delivery
4For instance, the fulllment fees requested by Amazon include three parts: (i) a per-order handling
fee, (ii) a pick and pack fee charged for each item included in the order (depending on their size), and
(iii) a fee based on the weight of the order (per pound).
5 In France, Amazons bargaining power is reinforced by its vertical integration strategy into the
delivery activity through the acquisition of Colis Privé.
6A notable recent exception is Panzar (2016), who examines an access oriented model for the US
parcel market. His focus is completely di¤erent from ours and the two approaches are complementary.
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service to the other retailer. In Stage 4, retailer 1 chooses independent delivery or
marketplace delivery. Finally, in Stage 5 the retailers simultaneously choose their prices
in either the I or M subgame. As usual we solve this game by backward induction to
characterize the subgame perfect Nash equilibrium.
While some analytical results can be obtained for the last stages of the sequential
game, a full solution of the delivery operators problem can only be achieved numer-
ically.7 These simulations allow us to address a number of interesting questions. In
particular we can determine the factors which will favor or impede the creation of mar-
ketplaces. We can also study the impact of this dynamic on prices, prots and welfare.
2 Model
The basic setup and the last stages of the game are based on Borsenberger et al.(2016).
To make this paper self-contained, we shall recall the main features. Consider an elec-
tronic retail market with two sellers (e-retailers) located at the endpoints 0 and 1 of a
Hotelling line. Consumers are identied by their location z 2 [0; 1] with a distribution
function G(z) with the density g(z). The Hotelling specication is the simplest way to
represent horizontal di¤erentiation. The variable z is not meant to describe a geograph-
ical location but rather a parameter characterizing the individualspreferences across
retailers.
The retailers sell a single product, which apart from their specic retail services is
otherwise homogenous. Its marginal cost, excluding delivery, is constant and denoted
by k.
There is a single delivery operator, who charges a rate of r0 to retailer 0. For the
time being bypass is ruled out but will be considered below. Seller 1 can either deliver
directly via postal operator at rate r; the general rate which also applies for single piece
customers. Alternatively, it can jointhe marketplace and use the delivery services of
retailer 0. This a¤ects utility and also the degree of product di¤erentiation. We will
7We consider continuous demand function and a general distribution of preferences accross the hori-
zontally di¤erentiated retailers (represented as transportationcosts). Restricting individual demands
to be 0 or 1 (as is typically done in IO models) and assuming a uniform distribution does not yield any
additional analytical results.
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consider these two market congurations separately.
2.1 Independent delivery
In this case referred to as subgame I, the utility of consumer z, who buys x units of the
good is given by
u(x)  p0x  tz2 if the good is sold by retailer 0
u(x)  p1x  t(1  z)2 if the good is sold by retailer 1, (1)
where pi is the price set by seller i. We have   1. Firm 0 is a more established
retailer, whose reputation translates into a higher quality perceived by the consumer,
which is captured by . Dene indirect utility (consumer surplus) as
v(a; q) = max
x
au(x)  qx; (2)
where a is the quality parameter and q the price.8
The marginal consumer bz(; 1; p0; p1) is dened by
v(; p0)  tbz2 = v(1; p1)  t(1  bz)2:
This consumer is indi¤erent between buying from retailer 0 or 1. All consumers with
a lower value of z will patronize retailer 0; they represent a share of G[bz(; 1; p0; p1)]
of the total population. The consumers with z  bz, who represent a share of (1  
G[bz(; 1; p0; p1)]) will buy from seller 1. Solving for bz yields
bz(; 1; p0; p1) = 1
2
+
v(; p0)  v(1; p1)
2t
: (3)
Aggregate (market) demand for the two products is given by
XI0 (; 1; p0; p1) = x(; p0)G[bz(; 1; p0; p1)]; (4)
XI1 (; 1; p0; p1) = x(1; p1)(1 G[bz(; 1; p0; p1)]): (5)
Prots of the e-retailers are given by
I0(; 1; p0; p1) = (p0   k   r0)XI0 (; 1; p0; p1); (6)
I1(; 1; p0; p1) = (p1   k   r)XI1 (; 1; p0; p1): (7)
8Depending on the retailer patronized by the consumer we have a =  and q = p0 or a = 1 and
q = p1.
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The e-retailers simultaneously set their prices and the solution is given by the Nash
equilibrium, denoted by the superscript NI. The equilibrium prices are then (pNI0 ; p
NI
1 ),
equilibrium demands are
XNI0 = X
I
0 (; 1; p
NI
0 ; p
NI
1 ); (8)
XNI1 = X
I
1 (; 1; p
NI
0 ; p
NI
1 ); (9)
and equilibrium prots are
NI0 = 
I
0(; 1; p
NI
0 ; p
NI
1 ); (10)
NI1 = 
I
1(; 1; p
NI
0 ; p
NI
1 ): (11)
The parcel delivery operators prots are given by
NI = (r0   c)XI0 (; 1; pNI0 ; pNI1 ) + (r   c)

XI1 (; 1; p
NI
0 ; p
NI
1 ) + Y (r)
  F (12)
where F denotes the delivery operators xed cost and where Y (r) is the demand for
single piece delivery services (by household and other small rms). Formally we have
Y (r) = argmax[S(Y )  rY ];
where S(Y ) is the (aggregate) gross surplus of single-piece customers (other than e-
retailers).
2.2 Marketplace delivery
In this case, referred to as subgame M , the utility of consumer z, who buys x units of
the good is given by
u(x)  p0x  tz2 if the good is sold by retailer 0
u(x)  p1x  t(1  z)2 if the good is sold by retailer 1, (13)
where   1, 1     and   1. The parameter  represents the property that
delivery through the marketplace reduces the degree of horizontal product di¤erentia-
tion. It reduces the utility loss customers experience when patronizing a retailer whose
characteristics di¤er from their preferred ones. Consequently the goods become closer
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substitutes and price competition will be more intense. When  > 1, marketplace deliv-
ery also increases the perceived quality of good 1; the other retailer now benets from
the reputation and warranties of the marketplace.
Proceeding as in subgame I, the marginal consumer is now determined by
ez(; ; p0; p1) = 1
2
+
v(; p0)  v(; p1)
2t
;
and aggregate (market) demand for the two products is
XM0 (; ; p0; p1) = x(; p0)G[ez(; ; p0; p1)]; (14)
XM1 (; ; p0; p1) = x(; p1)(1 G[ez(; ; p0; p1)]): (15)
Dene the retailers prots gross of the xed fee as
bM0 (; ; p0; p1; s) = (p0   k   r0)XM0 (; ; p0; p1) + (s  r0)XM1 (; ; p0; p1); (16)bM1 (; ; p0; p1; s) = (p1   k   s)XM1 (; ; p0; p1); (17)
where s is the per unit fee retailer 0; acting as a marketplace, charges to retailer 1.
Denoting the xed fee by T , prots of the e-retailers are given by
M0 (; ; p0; p1; s; T ) = bM0 (; ; p0; p1; s) + T; (18)
M1 (; ; p0; p1; s; T ) = bM1 (; ; p0; p1; s)  T: (19)
As in the case of independent delivery we assume that the e-retailers simultaneously
set their prices and that the solution is given by the Nash equilibrium, denoted by the
superscript NM . The equilibrium prices are denoted by (pNM0 ; p
NM
1 ). Substituting into
expressions (14)(17) yields the equilibrium demands and prot levels, i.e. counterparts
to expressions (8)(11).
Finally, the parcel delivery operators prots in the marketplace regime are given by
NM = (r0 c)

XM0 (; ; p
NM
0 ; p
NM
1 ) +X
M
1 (; ; p
NM
0 ; p
NM
1 )

+(r c)Y (r) F: (20)
Comparing equations (12) and (20) shows that the total sales of both retailers are
now delivered at the rate r0. The marketplace thus introduces a secondary market for
delivery services which, even in the absence of bypass, restricts the delivery operators
ability to di¤erentiate prices.
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2.3 Sequence of decisions
The timing of the full game consisting of delivery and retail pricing is as follows.
In Stage 1 the delivery operator sets r, to maximize welfare subject to a minimum
prot constraint. While this includes prot maximization as a special case, the prot
maximizing solution is also determined separately. In Stage 2, the delivery operator
and retailer 0 bargain over r0. In stage 3, retailer 0 chooses s, that is the per unit rate
and T , the xed fee at which it is willing to sell its delivery service to the other retailer.
In Stage 4, retailer 1 chooses independent delivery or marketplace delivery. Finally, in
Stage 5 the retailers simultaneously choose their prices p0 and p1 in either the I or M
subgame, described in Subsections 2.1 and 2.2 above.
As usual we solve this game by backward induction to characterize the subgame
perfect Nash equilibrium. At each stage the players (delivery operator or retailers) an-
ticipate the impact their choices will have on the equilibrium in the subsequent stages.
Though highly stylized, our model is too complicated to provide a full analytical solu-
tion. However, some analytical results can be obtained and in any event a thorough
examination of the various stages is necessary to properly dene the numerical solutions
we will calculate in Section 4.
3 Equilibrium
We start by studying the last stage of the game. At this point retailer 1 has already
decided if it delivers independently or via the marketplace. Consequently, the retailers
play subgame I or subgame M . We shall examine them separately.
3.1 Stage 5
3.1.1 Subgame I
At this point r0 and r are given and s is of no relevance because retailer 1 has decided not
to join the marketplace. The equilibrium of the price game yields the equilibrium prices,
pNI0 (r0; r), p
NI
1 (r0; r), and prots, 
NI
0 (r0; r), 
NI
1 (r0; r) as functions of the variables set
in the earlier stages.
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3.1.2 Subgame M
Once again, r0, r and s are given. The equilibrium of the price game yields pNM0 (r0; r; s),
pNM1 (r0; r; s) and the prot levels 
NM
0 (r0; r; s; T ) and 
NM
1 (r0; r; s; T ). Observe that s
a¤ects the equilibrium prices and prots, while T a¤ects only prots.
3.2 Stage 4
At this stage, retailer 1 will decide whether or not to join the marketplace. To do so it
will compare NI1 (r0; r) and 
NM
1 (r0; r; s; T ). When 
NI
1 (r0; r) > 
NM
1 (r0; r; s; T ), the
retailer will choose independent delivery. Otherwise it will join the marketplace.
3.3 Stage 3
Retailer 0, the potential marketplace, sets s and T and anticipating Stage 4 e¤ectively
decides if it wants to induce the other retailer to join the marketplace or not. If the
other rm joins, it will solve
max
s;T
bM0 + T (21)
s.t. bM1   T  I1 (22)
which can be written as
max
s
[(bM0 + bM1 )  I1 ]:
Note that I1 is a constant in this problem. Consequently this amounts to setting s so
as to maximize the sum of prots (total surplus of retailers) and use T to extract all
the surplus above I1 .
Retailer 0 will nd it protable to induce the other retailer to join the marketplace
if and only if
max
s
[(bM0 + bM1 )  I1 ]  I0
which is equivalent to
max
s
[bM0 + bM1 ]  I0 + I1 ; (23)
in words, this means that joint prots (sum of prots) are larger in M than in I. This
may or may not be true depending on the parameters. The creation of the marketplace
has three e¤ects on joint prots.
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1. It increases the perceived quality level of the good sold by retailer 1 as long as
 > 1. This e¤ect is positive (zero if  = 1)
2. It decreases the cost of delivering retailer 1s sales, as long as r0 < r. This e¤ect
is positive (zero if r0 = r).
3. It decreases the degree of horizontal di¤erentiation and thereby intensies price
competition in Stage 5. This e¤ect is negative (zero if  = 1).
The only case where analytical results can be obtained is when  =  = 1. Then, it is
plain that condition (23) is always satised. As long as r0  r retailer 0 can then always
replicate the I equilibrium under M by setting s = r. When r0 = r (23) then holds
as an equality; otherwise the inequality is strict. In other words, without a discount,
regime M weakly dominates, while it strictly dominates when r0 < r. Furthermore the
di¤erence between the joint prots in the two regimes (evaluated at s = r) increases as
r0 decreases. Now, of course s = r is not in general retailer 0s optimal strategy, but
this makes regime M only more attractive.
One can expect that this result continues to hold when  > 1. However, the compar-
ative statics of the price last stage subgames are too complicated to get an unambiguous
expression. We shall revisit this question through a numerical example in Section 4. On
the other hand,  < 1 appears to plead in favor of regime M .
Returning to the general case, whether or not condition (23) is satised depends, at
least potentially on r0, which is given at Stage 3 but endogenous in Stage 2. So we have
to study the comparative statics of condition (23) with respect to r0. Note that both
sides of the expression decrease with r0, but one can conjecture that the LHS decreases
faster (r0 concerns a larger volume under M than under I). When  is close to 1 and 
su¢ ciently large one can expect that the condition holds for all r0  r. In that case M
will always emerge. Otherwise, one would expect that there is a critical level er0 such
that r  er0 yields M , while we obtain I otherwise.
Note that the expressions in (23) are functions of (r0; r); more precisely, the RHS is
a function of (r0; r) and the LHS of r0.
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3.4 Stage 2
The delivery operator and retailer 0 bargain over r0. We describe the bargaining solution
as the level of r0 which maximizes a weighted sum of the delivery operator and the
retailers respective objectives. At this stage the delivery operator maximizes prots.
Consequently, the bargaining problem can be stated as
max
r0
N2 = (r0; r) + (1  )0(r0; r); (24)
s.t. r0  r; (25)
where all expressions are evaluated at the induced equilibrium in the subsequent stages,
and where 0    1 is the bargaining weight of the delivery operator.9 We remain
agnostic about the specic bargaining process which is used. We assume that the parties
can sign binding agreements so that the solution must be on the contract curve. In
other words it is Pareto e¢ cient from the rmsperspectives. This is a property shared
by all solution concepts considered in cooperative game theory. The specic point on the
contract curve which is adopted depends on the partiesrespective bargaining weights
 and (1  ). When  = 1, r0 is set so as to maximize the delivery operators prots;
the weights of the retailers prots increase as  increases. The solution is denoted
r0(r). Observe that the rigorous writing of these expressions is somewhat tedious. In
particular the expressions di¤er depending on the subgame I or M induced in the last
stage.
Observe that we can expect that
@0(r0; r)
@r0
 0:
The prots of the delivery operator, on the other hand can be increasing or decreasing
@(r0; r)
@r0
T 0:
9One can easily show that the solution to (24) is equivalent to that of a generalized Nash bargaining
solution given by
max
r0
eN2 = (r0; r)  [0(r0; r)  ]1  ; (26)
where  and  are the thread points (outside option that is solution when no agreement is achieved),
while 0    1 is the bargaining weight of the delivery operator. In other words, any solution to
problem (24) can be achieved as a solution to problem (26); the reverse is also true. We use (24)
because it is easier to solve numerically.
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To solve our problem, we have to distinguish two cases:
 @(r; r)=@r0 > 0. In that case prots of the delivery operator are maximized for
r0 = r (noting that r0 > r is not possible). In words, it is not protable for the
delivery operator to give a discount to retailer 0. In that case, r0 = r is on the
contract curve. It is the solution to the bargaining problem when  = 1 (and
possibly in the neighborhood of  = 1). In words, we get no discount as long
as the bargaining weight of the delivery operator is su¢ ciently large. Otherwise
r0 < r is possible.
 @(r0; r)=@r0 < 0. Now, the delivery operator can increase its prots by giving
a discount to retailer 0. In that case there exists a level 0 < rpm0 < r, which
maximizes the delivery operators prots. This (namely r0 = r
pm
0 ) is also the
solution to the bargaining problem if  = 1, that is if the delivery operator has all
the bargaining weight and can freely choose r0 to maximize its prots. Otherwise,
when  < 1, we will get r0 < r
pm
0 . In words, because of the retailers bargaining
power, the delivery operator has to concede a discount that exceeds the prot
maximizing level.
In either case we expect
@r0(r)
@r
 0:
3.5 Stage 1
Since the expressions di¤er according to the induced subgame in the last stage, we have
to write this problem in 2 steps. First we solve the following two problems
PM = max
r
NM [r0(r); r];
s.t. (r0(r); r) 2 SM :
P I = max
r
NI [r0(r); r];
s.t. (r0(r); r) 2 SI :
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where SM denotes the set of (r0; r) which yields
max
s
[bM0 (r0) + bM1 (r0)]  I0(r0; r) + I1(r0; r);
so that a marketplace equilibrium is induced. Similarly we denote SI the set of (r0; r)
which yield
max
s
[bM0 (r0) + bM1 (r0)]  I0(r0; r) + I1(r0; r);
so that an I equilibrium is induced. Observe that when the condition holds as equality
(r0; r) belongs to both sets.
The solution is then obtained by comparing the prot levels achieved at these two
solutions. We assume that to set r the delivery operator maximizes either (i) prots or
(ii) welfare as measured by the sum of consumer and producer surplus.
3.5.1 Prot maximization
Now, the delivery operator chooses r to solve
max
r
[r0(r); r]: (27)
The solution depends on the elasticity of Y (r), particularly if regime M is induced in
the subsequent stages.
3.5.2 Welfare maximization
Dene welfare as the sum of consumer and producer surplus
W (r0; r) = CS(r0; r) + (r0; r) + 0(r0; r) + 1(r0; r):
Then in stage 1 the delivery operator maximizes W [r0(r); r] subject to a minimum
prot constraint [r0(r); r]  , where the prot requirement  is exogenously given.
Denoting   0 the Lagrange multiplier associated with prot constraint, this problem
is equivalent to the maximization of
W (r0(r); r; ) = CS(r

0(r); r) + (1 + )(r

0(r); r) + 0(r

0(r); r) + 1(r

0(r); r); (28)
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where the level of  is exogenously chosen. Observe that setting  = 0 yields the
unconstrained welfare maximum, while !1 yields the prot maximizing solution as
special cases.
As in the prot maximizing case, the specication of all these expressions of course
depends on the induced regime I or M . Thus one has to consider the cases where
(r0(r); r) 2 SM and where (r0(r); r) 2 SI separately and then compare the achieved
level of W .
4 Numerical illustrations
Though stylized, our model is too complex to obtain further analytical results. Ob-
serve that we consider individuals with continuous demand functions, which is typically
not done in IO models which concentrate on indivisible goods. This makes even the
last stages of the game very complicated.10 Consequently, we resort to numerical il-
lustrations. We rst present the underlying specication and the parameters used in
the benchmark case. Then we present and discuss some results starting with the case
where the delivery operator maximizes prots. Then we turn to the situation where the
delivery operator maximizes welfare.
4.1 Numerical strategy
The solution to Stages 35 follows exactly the theoretical model. Stage 2 was more
challenging because the specication of the objective depends on the regime induced in
the subsequent stages. While this is not problematic in the theoretical specication of
the game, the numerical solution required some detours. We have considered the two
regimes separately. For I we have solved
max NI (r0; r) + (1  )I0 (r0; r) (29)
s.t :I0 (r0; r) + 
I
1 (r0; r)  ^M0 (r0; r) + bM1 (r0; r) (30)
s.t : r  r0 (31)
10But even with zero-one individual demands, the full game cannot be solved analytically.
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which yields rI0 (r) in 3 regimes: one in which the FOC is simply solved. One in which
the participation constraint (30) binds. One in which r  r0 binds.
Similarly, for M we have analyzed
max NM (r0; r) + (1  ) ^M0 (r0; r) (32)
s.t :^M0 (r0; r) + ^
M
1 (r0; r)  I0 (r0; r) + I1 (r0; r) (33)
s.t : r  r0 (34)
which yields rM0 (r) in 3 regimes: one in which the FOC is simply solved. One in which
the participation constraint (33) binds. One in which r  r0 binds. The solution is
then determined by evaluating the respective objective functions for the results of the
di¤erent subcases. This yields r0(r) which is then used to maximize the rst stage
objective (prot or welfare).
4.2 The benchmark parameters of the model
We make use of the following benchmark values: k = 10; c = 0:5; t = 20;  = 1:1,
 = 1;  = 1. We further assume linear individual demand functions for the goods sold
by rms 0 and 1. These are obtained from quadratic utilities of the form11
u (; x) = 
 
bx  ax2 ; if x > 0: (35)
so that
x (; p) =
b
2a
  p
2a
:
which are such that (i) their direct price elasticity is  4 at a consumer price of 10, and
(ii) that x (1; 10) = 10. This yields
a = 0:125 and b = 12:5:
For the demand Y (r), we assume that its direct price elasticity is  3 at a consumer
price of 3 with Y (3) = 0:5. This yields
Y =

b0
2a0
  r
2a0

11We concentrate on the case where the entire market is covered. To ensure that this is the case
we assume that u(; 0) =  A, where A is su¢ ciently large to make sure that every consumer buys a
positive level of x in equilibrium. The case where the entire market is not covered is not interesting. It
yields too localmonopolies so that there is no strategic interaction between retailers in equilibrium.
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with
a0 = 1 and b0 = 4.
Except for reecting the stylized facts about market shares and elasticities these pa-
rameter values are not meant to represent a realistic calibration. Parcel delivery xed
costs are neglected. They would not change the equilibrium allocation, except that they
have to be deducted from the delivery operators reported prot. We nally assume that
the distribution of tastes G is uniform over [0; 1].
4.3 Numerical results: prot maximization
4.3.1 The benchmark case
Table 1 presents the results in the benchmark case for the levels of the delivery operators
bargaining weight in Stage 2:  = 1; 0:75 and 0:5. The solutions are all in regime M ;
since  =  = 1, this is consistent with the theoretical predictions. We also report
the counterfactual (CF) in regime I. This represents the equilibrium in subgame I
induced by the considered level of r0 and r. This is an interesting benchmark even
though this subgame is not reached in equilibrium. In particular, the equilibrium prot
of retailer 1 in this subgame, I1 (r0; r) ; determines the level of T ; see equations (21)
(22). The columns no Mgive the solution when regime M is ruled out in an ad hoc
way. The delivery operator then faces two independent but competing retailers. Most
notations are in line with the theoretical part, except for CSX and CSY which represent
the consumer surplus associated with X and Y respectively. Let us start by examining
the results obtained for  = 1. In that case there is e¤ectively no bargaining, and both
rates are set by the delivery operator to maximize its prots. Still, the solution implies a
discount for retailer 0. This does not come as a surprise. When  = 1, r is set exclusively
to maximize prots extracted from single piece customers; it does not a¤ect the prot
the delivery operator can earn from the delivery of good X. Since the demand for X is
more elastic than the demand for Y , the discount is in line with standard third degree
price discrimination results. This is of course just a rough intuition because it ignores
all intermediatee¤ects. For instance, the elasticity of X with respect to r0 depends
on the degree of pass-through which, in turn, depends on the strategic interaction in
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regime M  = 1 CF I no M  = 0:75 CF I no M  = 0:5 CF I no M
p0 12.71 12.70 12.74 12.56 12.55 12.59 11.97 11.95 11.95
p1 12.28 12.37 12.18 12.16 12.37 12.13 11.74 12.40 12.05
s 2.07 - - 1.86 - 1.13 - -
T 0.04 - - 0.13 - 0.69 - -
r0 1.83 1.83 1.89 1.56 1.56 1.65 0.55 0.55 0.57
r 2.25 2.25 1.89 2.25 2.25 1.81 2.30 2.30 1.67
0 (^0 when M) 2.05 2.00 1.79 2.73 2.68 2.33 6.32 6.38 5.92
1 (^1 when M) 0.07 0.03 0.15 0.15 0.02 0.19 0.70 0.01 0.23
 5.02 4.96 5.19 4.88 4.78 5.08 1.80 1.98 2.38
X0=(X0 +X1) 0.86 0.92 0.80 0.83 0.94 0.81 0.78 0.97 0.88
X1= (X0 +X1) 0.14 0.08 0.20 0.17 0.06 0.19 0.22 0.03 0.12
X0=(X0 +X1 + Y ) 0.65 0.68 0.58 0.65 0.72 0.60 0.67 0.83 0.71
X1=(X0 +X1 + Y ) 0.10 0.06 0.14 0.13 0.05 0.14 0.19 0.02 0.10
Y=(X0 +X1 + Y ) 0.25 0.26 0.28 0.22 0.23 0.26 0.14 0.15 0.19
CSX -17.36 -17.84 -16.87 -17.09 -18.27 -16.87 -15.40 -20.38 -17.53
CSY 0.76 0.76 1.10 0.76 0.76 1.19 0.71 0.71 1.34
W -9.44 -10.07 -8.62 -8.55 -10.01 -8.06 -5.85 -11.29 -7.65
Table 1: Simulation results for the benchmark case with  = 1:1,  =  = 1.
subgame M . The strategic interaction also explains that s > r0: the marketplace
charges a delivery fee that exceeds its marginal cost. This increases the competitors
cost which has two conicting e¤ects. First, it increases retailer 0s equilibrium prot.
Second, it also reduces retailer 1s prot and thus the amount retailer 0 can extract via
T .
As far as consumer prices are concerned, we rather surprisingly have p0 > p1: retailer
0s cost advantage (r0 < s) is not passed through to consumers, quite the opposite. With
 = 1:1 >  = 1, retailer 0 has a quality advantage of which it takes advantage to achieve
a larger market share and a larger prot than the other retailer. This comes on top of
its strategic advantage: by setting s it can inuence retailer 1s reaction function in the
M subgame to achieve a largeequilibrium price.
If given the delivery rates r0 and r1, retailer 1 would stay independent we obtain
the outcome described in column CF I. It represents the equilibrium of subgame I,
which is not played in the equilibrium of the full game. In fact, both consumers and the
delivery operator would be worse o¤ in this case and welfare would be lower. Retailer 1
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is by construction indi¤erent (because bM1   T = I1), but retailer 0 obviously benets
from the creation of the marketplace; otherwise the equilibrium would not be in regime
M .
Column with no M presents the equilibrium if, for whatever reasons, regulatory or
others, the creation of a marketplace is not an option. With  = 1, the constraint
r0  r is then binding. This means that absent of regime I and of bargaining the prot
maximizing delivery operator does not give a discount to retailer 0. As a matter of
fact if this were possible it would even want to set r0 above r. For the rest, all parties
(including the delivery operator and the other retailer) except of course of retailer 0
would be better o¤ in that case. Consumer surplus and total welfare would also be
larger.
The remaining columns present the results when the delivery operator has lower
bargaining weights. Not surprisingly, the discount achieved by retailer 0 increases as
its bargaining weight increases, and its equilibrium prot follows suit. As expected,
the prot of the delivery operator decreases and the reduction in both retailers prices
also increases welfare and consumer surplus (from X). Notice that while p0 decreases it
remains larger than p1 and the price decrease falls short of the decrease in r0. The single
piece delivery rate r, on the other hand, increases as  decreases so that the surplus of
single piece customers also goes down. This is because as  < 1 the single piece delivery
rate is no longer solely determined by the single piece market since it also a¤ects actors
prots (via its impact on the counterfactual). When  = 1 this e¤ect plays no role in
the objectives of the rst two stages. However, when  < 1, it does a¤ect the second
stage objective which spills over into the rst stage choices.
We now consider a number of scenarios obtained by changing one of the parameters;
all others remain the same as in the benchmark case.
4.3.2 Case of =1.1
In the benchmark case we had  = 1. This means that joining the marketplace has
no impact on the perceived quality of retailer 1s product. Let us now consider an
alternative level of  and in a way go to the other extreme by setting  =  = 1:1.
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regime M  = 1 CF I  = 0:5 CF I
p0 12.86 12.86 12.03 12.02
p1 12.93 12.37 12.24 12.40
s 2.26 - 1.13
T 0.95 - 2.89
r0 2.10 2.10 0.66
r 2.25 2.25 2.31
0 (^0 when M) 1.45 1.43 5.70 5.89
1 (^1 when M) 0.98 0.03 2.90 0.01
 6.49 4.96 2.48 2.44
X0=(X0 +X1) 0.53 0.90 0.56 0.97
X1= (X0 +X1) 0.47 0.10 0.44 0.03
X0=(X0 +X1 + Y ) 0.41 0.64 0.49 0.82
X1=(X0 +X1 + Y ) 0.37 0.07 0.39 0.02
Y=(X0 +X1 + Y ) 0.22 0.29 0.12 0.16
CSX -26.01 -17.47 -22.47 -20.18
CSY 0.76 0.76 0.71 0.71
W -16.31 -10.28 -10.67 -11.11
Table 2: Simulation results with  = 1:1:
Consequently, when retailer 1 joins the marketplace, it fully benets from retailer 0s
quality advantage. The results are presented inTable 2.
Interestingly prices are higher even though products are now less di¤erentiated which
one would expect to lead to a more intense price competition. However, quality of
retailer 1 is larger than in the benchmark case. This increases the willingness to pay
of consumers which via the strategic interaction leads to higher prices in the last stage
subgame. Furthermore, delivery rates are larger as both r0 and s increase. The single
piece rate remains unchanged for  = 1; it continues to be set only with regard to single
piece mail demand Y . When  = 0:5, on the other hand, r a¤ects the second stage
objective and it is set at a larger level than in the benchmark case. And this increase
is shifted in part to the consumers. So much that we have now p1 > p0 and that CSX
decreases signicantly in spite of the increase in quality.12 Not surprisingly 0 also
increases.13
12Since the utility of retailer 1s customer changes, this welfare comparison has to be interpreted with
care. It makes sense if we think of the quality of the product as an argument of the utility function.
13Recall that in regime M retailer 0s prots are given by b0+ T and the decrease in b0 is more than
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regime M  = 1 CF I  = 0:5 CF I
p0 12.70 12.72 11.93 11.94
p1 12.37 12.37 11.98 12.40
s 2.24 - 1.59
T -0.002 - 0.22
r0 1.86 1.86 0.53
r 2.25 2.25 2.31
0 (^0 when M) 2.17 1.95 7.20 6.46
1 (^1 when M) 0.02 0.02 0.23 0.01
 5.18 4.97 1.71 1.89
X0=(X0 +X1) 0.93 0.92 0.89 0.98
X1= (X0 +X1) 0.07 0.08 0.11 0.02
X0=(X0 +X1 + Y ) 0.70 0.68 0.77 0.83
X1=(X0 +X1 + Y ) 0.05 0.06 0.1 0.02
Y=(X0 +X1 + Y ) 0.25 0.26 0.13 0.15
CSX -11.14 -17.81 -9.43 -20.43
CSY 0.76 0.76 0.71 0.71
W -3.00 -10.09 0.43 -11.34
Table 3: Simulation results with  = 0:7.
For the rest, given  = 1:1, the e¤ect of an increase in the retailers bargaining
weights follows pretty much the same pattern as in the benchmark case.
4.3.3 Case of  = 0:7
We now return to  = 1 but assume that  = 0:7 rather than 1. Consequently, the
degree of horizontal di¤erentiation between retailers decreases as the marketplace is set
up. The results for this case are presented in Table 3.
One would expect that this leads to lower prices and indeed p0 decreases but p1
e¤ectively increases. This follows the increase in s; as goods become closer substitutes
retailer 0 nds it protable to increase the competitors cost even more than in the
benchmark case. Not surprisingly all this combined with retailers quality advantage
results in an overwhelming market share for retailer 0. Observe that r0 also increases
but to a lesser extent than s. The delivery operators prots increase slightly when  = 1
and decrease when  = 0:5 (compared to the benchmark situation). In either case, the
compensated by the increase in T .
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equilibrium is in regimeM . As mentioned in Subsection 3.3 with  < 1, regime I cannot
be ruled out a priori. However, as conjectured in the analytical part, the comparative
statics of the price equilibrium are indeed nontrivial, since one of the prices increases.
So at the end, regime M remains the better choice for operator 1.
Once again the pattern according to which the equilibrium changes with  is similar
to that observed in the benchmark case. In particular welfare increases as the delivery
operators market power decreases. This comes of course at the expense of a decrease in
the delivery operators prot, and while r remains large, r0 gets rather close to marginal
cost (which is equal to 0:5). While this appears to be a good thing, it may in reality
be problematic since its prots may not be su¢ cient to cover xed costs.
4.4 Numerical results: welfare maximization
In stage 1 we now maximize
W (r0(r); r; ) =  [CS(r

0(r); r) + 0(r

0(r); r) + 1(r

0(r); r)] + (1  )(r0(r); r) (36)
with  = 0:4. This is equivalent to maximizing (28) by dening
 =
1
2 + 
or (1  ) = 1 + 
2 + 
so that  = 0 corresponds to  = 0:5 while !1 yields  = 0. Observe that  = 0:4
is equivalent to  = 0:5. This is probably too large when  is seen as a cost of public
funds but this interpretation assumes that the decit of the delivery operator (recall
that the prot  we report does not account for the xed cost) would be nanced by
a transfer from the government. When the delivery operator is required to break even
and the xed costs are su¢ ciently large we can have larger levels of . Recall that in
stage 2 when setting r0, the delivery operator continues to maximize prots.
It is well know that when  is zero or su¢ ciently small the solution involves a delivery
rate that is set below marginal cost. To be more precise in our setting, r would be set
at marginal cost, while r0 would be subsidized so as to bring the nal prices closer to
marginal costs. This results of course in a decit for the delivery operator but with
 = 0 we implicitly assume that this can be nanced from the general budget at no
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regime M  = 1 CF I no M  = 0:5 CF I no M
p0 12.17 12.13 12.01 11.95 11.91 12.01
p1 11.89 11.61 11.49 11.73 11.89 11.49
s 1.38 - 1.10 -
T -0.56 - 0.30 -
r0 0.90 0.90 0.71 0.51 0.51 0.71
r 0.90 0.90 0.71 1.39 1.39 0.71
0 (^0 when M) 4.89 4.21 4.79 6.48 5.97 4.79
1 (^1 when M) 0.48 1.04 1.31 0.73 0.43 1.31
 2.43 2.61 1.47 1.25 2.01 1.47
X0=(X0 +X1) 0.79 0.70 0.69 0.77 0.83 0.69
X1= (X0 +X1) 0.21 0.30 0.31 0.23 0.17 0.31
X0=(X0 +X1 + Y ) 0.58 0.53 0.53 0.62 0.66 0.53
X1=(X0 +X1 + Y ) 0.16 0.23 0.24 0.18 0.14 0.24
Y=(X0 +X1 + Y ) 0.26 0.24 0.23 0.20 0.20 0.23
CSX -16.11 -14.63 -14.01 -15.32 -16.44 -14.01
CSY 2.39 2.39 2.70 1.69 1.69 2.70
W -5.90 -4.37 -3.72 -5.15 -6.32 -3.72
Table 4: Simulation results: welfare maximization in the benchmark case:  = 1:1;
 = 1 and  = 1.
cost. This isnt hardly a realistic scenario to consider and we set  su¢ ciently high to
avoid this kind of situation. For the rest, we return to the parameters considered in the
benchmark scenario in the previous subsection. The results are reported in Table 4.
The results do not o¤er any major surprises. Delivery rates are lower than in the
prot maximizing case.14 Not surprisingly this is more signicant for  = 1 than
for  < 0:5; in the latter case the delivery operators market power is in any way
already lessened by the bargaining process. The decrease is also more signicant for
r than for r0. Under prot maximization regime, the single piece rate was a pure
monopoly price (or close to it); the price setting was not or very little a¤ected by
strategic considerations. Accordingly the markup was large and switching to welfare
maximization has a dramatic impact. In all scenarios consumer prices of both product
are of course lower than in the prot maximizing case, but it appears once again that
the decrease in delivery rates is only partially passed through to nal consumers. This
14The constraint r0  is binding for  = 1.
22
also explains why both retailers prots are now larger and so are CSX and especially
CSY . Finally the delivery operators prots decrease and, again, the decrease is most
signicant in the  = 1 scenario.
To sum up, switching from prot to welfare maximization in the rst stage has the
most signicant e¤ect when  = 1. When  < 1, the market power of the delivery
operator has already diminished, which brings the rates closer to marginal costs. How-
ever, in that case the benets of the rate reduction are to a large extent caught by the
retailers. This e¤ect remains present for a switch from prot to welfare maximization,
but it is mitigated.
5 Conclusion
This paper has examined the link between the delivery rates charged by parcel delivery
operators and the e-commerce market structure. In reality electronic retail markets are
characterized by the growing importance of marketplaces, who o¤er a variety of services
including delivery to its a¢ liated e-retailers. From a parcel delivery operators perspec-
tive, marketplaces create a secondary delivery market which undermines its ability to
di¤erentiate prices. Consequently, the market structure in the e-commerce sector will
a¤ect the pricing strategy of the delivery operator. Interestingly, the e¤ect will also
go in the opposite direction: the pricing structure of the parcel delivery operator will
in part determine the development of marketplaces. More specically, we developed a
model in which two retailers, a big one, 0, and a smaller one, 1, sell a homogenous good
online. Retailer 0 may o¤er its competitor the option to join its marketplace through
the payment of a xed fee along with a per unit rate. A¢ liation to the marketplace
has several consequences for retailer 1. First, it reduces the degree of di¤erentiation
between the products. Second, it increases the perceived quality of retailer 1s product
which in turn increases the consumerswillingness to pay and, third, the marketplace
consolidates the parcels send by retailers 0 and 1 and could, in theory obtain better
pricing conditions from the parcel delivery operator. This last point is reinforced by
the fact that it is assumed the marketplace has some monopsony power: the delivery
rate set by the parcel delivery operator to the marketplace results from a bargaining
23
process. The timing of the full game is as follows. In Stage 1 the postal operator sets
the single piece rate. In Stage 2, the postal operator and retailer 0 bargain over the de-
livery rate paid by the marketplace. In stage 3, retailer 0, acting as marketplace chooses
the per-unit rate and the xed fee at which it is willing to sell its delivery service to
the other retailer. In Stage 4, retailer 1 chooses independent delivery or marketplace
delivery. Finally, in Stage 5 the retailers simultaneously choose their prices in either the
independent or marketplace subgame.
Under these conditions and according to the assumptions made in the numerical
simulations, we obtain that a marketplace will always emerge in prot maximizing
equilibrium, even if from a social point of view, the welfare would be higher if the
creation of a marketplace was not an option. Indeed, the marketplace allows the big e-
retailer to make higher prots thanks to the possibility to extract some of its competitor
prot through the a¢ liation xed fee and to increase its own price. Even if the parcel
delivery operator gives a discount to the marketplace, it makes higher prots since
through its e¤ect on the quality perceived, the marketplace has a positive impact on
demand, increasing the number of parcels to be delivered. Consumers are better o¤
since retailer 1s price is lower in the marketplace regime than in the independent one
and the (perceived) quality is higher. And by denition, the small retailer is indi¤erent
between the independent and marketplace regime.
Not surprisingly, the discount achieved by retailer 0 increases as its bargaining weight
increases, leading to the increase of its prots and the reduction of that of the delivery
operator. The reduction in the delivery rate set to the marketplace is partially passed
through to the nal price paid by consumers, increasing their surplus and the global
welfare. In other words, from a social point of view, it is better to have balanced
bargaining powers between the delivery operator and the marketplace.
To sum up, the following three main lessons emerge from our results. First, the
equilibrium nearly always implies a discount to the leading retailer, even when the
prot maximizing operator has all the bargaining power.15 Second, the delivery operator
cannot avoid the emergence of a marketplace even though this decreases its prots
15And this is true even at the (out of equilibrium) subgames with independent delivery.
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(compared to the hypothetical situation where a marketplace is not permitted). This is
because the possibility of using a two part tari¤ for marketplace services, provides the
dominant retailer with a tremendous strategic advantage. It can set the variable fee to
enhance its competitive position in the subsequent pricing game, while extracting all
extra prots via the xed fee.
The combination of these two e¤ects then leads to discounted rates which get fairly
close to marginal cost, especially when the bargain weight of the retailer increases.
While this is very good for the marketplace retailer and some of the benets are passed
through to consumers the big looser is not surprisingly the delivery operator who may
not be able to cover its xed cost. Consequently, the growing bargaining power of
marketplaces in their negotiations with parcel delivery operators in several European
countries could raise concerns, notably if this prevents the latter to cover their xed
costs and calls for a transfer from the government to nance the provision of the postal
universal service.
This brings us to the third lesson, namely that market power of the delivery operator
cannot be assessed solely by considering its market share. Indeed, our analysis has shown
that even a monopoly operator my e¤ectively have little market power. Put di¤erently,
because of the monopsony power of marketplaces, regulators and competition authorities
may tend to overestimate the dominant positionof delivery operators. Consequently,
the market may well be more competitive than market shares suggest, and a too activist
regulatory intervention can be counterproductive. The suitability of regulation in the
parcel delivery market has to be carefully assessed and accounted for market power on
both sides of the market.
Our analysis could be extended in a number of directions. First, one could consider
a e-commerce sector with a large number of small retailers who may or may not join the
marketplace. This would give our model a more realistic avor but is unlikely to have
a dramatic e¤ect on the results. Second, and more interestingly, competition between
marketplaces could be considered. This in turn would reinforce the bargaining position
of parcel delivery operators and could mitigate our results. However, as mentioned in the
introduction, there is a strong trend to concentration in the e-commerce sector and the
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assumption of a single (or dominant) marketplace is empirically appealing. Third, one
could consider competition between delivery operators, but this could only strengthen
our results and reinforce the monopsony power of the marketplace. This is particularly
true when one of the delivery operators is vertically integrated with the marketplace.16
Last but not least, a more comprehensive calibrations or even a fully edged empirical
investigation would be of great use for the design of precise policy recommendation.
However, at this point the available data are scarce. Contractual arrangements between
operators and marketplaces are typically not public information, and the e-commerce
sector is evolving at such a speed that any available data are likely to be obsolete
by the time they could be explored in an empirical investigation. Consequently, our
numerical exercise which matches levels of demand elasticities that are consistent with
conventional wisdom appears to be the best that can be achieved.
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